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Abstract
What do we know about the size of the rebound effect? Should we believe claims that energy
efficiency improvements lead to an increase in energy use? This paper clarifies what the rebound effect is,
and provides a guide for economists and policymakers interested in its magnitude. We describe how some
papers in the literature consider the rebound effect from a costless exogenous increase in energy
efficiency, while others examine the effects of a particular energy efficiency policy—a distinction that
leads to very different welfare and policy implications. We present the most reliable evidence available
quantifying the energy efficiency rebound, and discuss areas where estimation is extraordinarily difficult.
Along these lines, we offer a new way of thinking about the macroeconomic rebound effect. Overall, the
existing research provides little support for the so-called “backfire” hypothesis. Still, much remains to be
understood, particularly relating to induced innovation and productivity growth.
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The Rebound Effect and Energy Efficiency Policy
Kenneth Gillingham, David Rapson, and Gernot Wagner
Introduction
Buy a more fuel-efficient car, drive more. That is the most well-known intuition for the
rebound effect. Its existence is clear, and it has been for a long time: Jevons (1865) hypothesized
that greater energy efficiency may even lead to a “backfire” of increased industrial energy use.
However, the magnitude of the rebound effect is much less clear, and estimates show incredible
variation—with stark implications for energy efficiency policy.
The differences in estimates of the rebound effect stem from its varying definitions, as
well as variation in the quality of data and empirical methodologies used to estimate it. The goal
of this paper is to clarify the definition of each of the channels of the rebound effect and critically
assess the state of the literature that estimates its magnitude. We emphasize the difference
between the rebound effect from a costless exogenous energy efficiency improvement—what we
call a ‘Zero-Cost Breakthrough’ (ZCB)—and the rebound effect from an actual energy efficiency
policy—a ‘Policy-Induced Improvement’ (PII). Acknowledging this distinction can help with
interpreting estimates in the literature. The common approach of using empirically estimated fuel
price or operating cost elasticities of demand as one measure of the rebound effect should be
treated with caution. However, since there is a reliable literature estimating these elasticities,
they often provide the most useful information available.
When we consider the total rebound effect, and especially effects that may occur at the
macroeconomic level, reliable empirical estimates are much harder to come by. We review
estimates in the literature, where available, and provide a conceptual discussion to help



Yale University; e-mail: kenneth.gillingham@yale.edu; University of California, Davis; e-mail:
dsrapson@ucdavis.edu; Environmental Defense Fund, adjunct associate professor at Columbia University’s School
of International and Public Affairs, and research associate at Harvard Kennedy School; e-mail: gwagner@edf.org.
Acknowledgments: The research for this paper arose from an Environmental Defense Fund workshop. Our special
thanks go to Matthew Kotchen, who helped conceptualize this project. We thank Blake Alcott, Severin Borenstein,
Dallas Burtraw, Nathan Chan, Frank Convery, Manuel Frondel, Nathaniel O. Keohane, Reid Leifset, Derek
Lemoine, Kenneth Small, Thomas Sterner, Karen Turner, Colin Vance, Matthew Zaragoza-Watkins, Richard J.
Zeckhauser, the editor, and two anonymous referees for comments, as well as Jonathan Camuzeaux, Ruiwen Lee,
and Paige Weber for excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are our own. The authors are not aware of
any conflicts of interest. Kenneth Gillingham was formerly a research assistant at Resources for the Future.

1

Resources for the Future

Gillingham, Rapson, and Wagner

contextualize the existing estimates and provide intuition into magnitudes where empirical
evidence is scarce. Our review of the literature leads us to conclude that a continued focus within
policy debates on backfire is largely unwarranted, and distracts from the issue of utmost
importance: evaluating the economic efficiency of energy efficiency policies. The rebound effect
is just one component of this more important analysis. Moreover, the rebound effect usually
improves economic efficiency, so policies aimed at mitigating the rebound effect, as have been
discussed in the literature (e.g., van den Bergh (2011)) and policy community (e.g., Gloger
(2011)), are likely counterproductive from a welfare perspective. However, in assessing the
potential for backfire, path dependency in innovation is a ‘wild card.’ Despite decades of
research on the rebound effect, there is still much to be learned, and we point to several highpotential avenues.
The paper is structured as follows. We first define the different components of the
rebound effect. We then briefly summarize quantitative evidence on the different channels of
rebound effect, and discuss challenges to identifying causal rebound effects in each. Finally, we
conclude with implications for energy efficiency policy. Along the way, we point out popular
misconceptions of about the rebound and how to address them.
Defining the Rebound Effect
The classic way to think about the rebound effect conjectures an improvement in energy
efficiency and compares the achieved reductions in energy use to the forecasted reductions in
energy use that ignore consumer and market responses. Such consumer and market-wide
responses are likely to occur because the energy efficiency improvement changes relative prices
(and real income). The rebound effect is expressed as a percentage of the forecasted reduction in
energy use that is ‘lost’ due to the sum of consumer and market responses.
To illustrate, consider an air conditioner with annual electricity use of 100 kWh/year.
Suppose a more efficient air conditioner shaved 10 kWh/year off this total before accounting for
any consumer and market responses. If these responses increased electricity use by 1 kWh/year,
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then the rebound effect would be equal to 10 percent, since 1 of the 10 kWh per year in expected
energy savings would be retaken by consumer and market responses.1
This broad definition captures the essence of the rebound effect, but abstracts from how
energy efficiency is improved and what happens to other product attributes. The literature
handles these issues remarkably differently, which can lead to confusion around what the
rebound effect is exactly, how to estimate it, and how to interpret the results. A first-order
distinction is whether we are considering (1) an exogenous increase in energy efficiency holding
other attributes constant or (2) a change in energy efficiency that is bundled with changes in
other product attributes. The latter may induce a change in the energy service provided and
perhaps also a change in the cost of the product.2
To illustrate this distinction, first consider a ZCB: a scenario where an innovation allows
a product (e.g., appliance) manufacturer to increase energy efficiency costlessly, while holding
all other attributes of the product the same. The subsequent consumer and market responses are a
pure conception of the rebound effect, for they capture only responses induced by an
improvement in energy efficiency.
In contrast, consider a PII: a scenario where an energy efficiency policy requires
manufacturers to improve the energy efficiency of a particular product. In this case, the energy
efficiency improvement may be costly, potentially raising the price of the product. Concurrently,
it may induce or even necessitate changes in other attributes of the product, such as size, weight
or capacity. In this case both the price and the energy service provided by the product may
change along with energy efficiency.
There may be a continuum between ZCB and PII, whereby a rebound effect captures
some, but not all, of the changes from a policy. Such intermediates may be more difficult to
interpret for providing policy insights, depending on the specific circumstances. Accordingly, we
focus our discussion on the two extremes: ZCB and PII.

1

Here we follow the literature by defining the rebound effect with respect to energy. One could analogously define
the rebound effect with respect to emissions (Thomas et al. 2013), which in many cases is proportional to the energy
rebound. Exceptions include biofuels policies that lead to indirect land use emissions, or policies that lead to fuel
switching, for example from coal to natural gas, and, thus, from carbon to methane emissions.
Energy is a derived demand from the consumers’ demand for energy services (e.g., miles driven in a particular car,
refrigeration, etc). These energy services themselves may change along with the attributes of a product (e.g., a
refrigerator with an ice maker provides a different energy service than one without).
2
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For both estimation and policy purposes, it is crucial to distinguish between ZCB and PII.
Suppose we want to estimate a response attributed directly to an energy efficiency improvement.
Then the ZCB scenario is likely to be a better guide to the effect. Any empirical estimation that
controls for all of the key attributes of a product is aiming to identify this effect. This approach is
the most common way to estimate what most authors call the rebound effect. In contrast, if we
are interested in the overall effect of a policy—the bundle of changes that occurs, including but
not limited to energy efficiency—then PII is the appropriate approach. The goal would be to
estimate a compound effect that combines the energy savings from the efficiency improvement
with the energy adjustments due to the change in attributes and cost of the product. It may even
capture changes in sales of the product or other consequences, depending on the empirical
setting. To calculate the PII rebound effect, one could examine the difference in the forecasted
energy savings based on a simple engineering calculation and the empirically estimated effect.
This result, while more appropriate for considering the energy implications of specific policies,
is not generally equivalent to the perhaps more ‘pure’ conception of the rebound effect.
Which of these two approaches should we prefer for policy analysis? The answer
depends. Isolating the effect of an exogenous energy efficiency improvement on the consumer
and market responses (ZCB) provides clear guidance for policymakers on how changes in energy
efficiency alone would change energy use. The results are likely to be more applicable across
settings by virtue of holding constant potentially confounding variables. They may be used to
demonstrate the degree to which the rebound effect improves social welfare by providing energy
services that consumers value. Moreover, if policy-induced energy efficiency improvements are
associated with only negligible costs and changes in attributes, estimates for ZCB may be similar
to those for PII.
However, in most cases when there is an energy efficiency policy there are also changes
in costs and attributes, the responses to which are difficult to disentangle empirically. To analyze
such an energy efficiency policy it is essential to know all of the pertinent consumer and market
responses to the improved efficiency, changed attributes, and increased cost. All these different
responses comprising the policy’s effect play a role in what ultimately matters most: the social
welfare effects of the policy.
The distinction between the two approaches for thinking about the rebound effect
provides important context for our review of the literature. Most studies that aim to estimate the
rebound effect have an exogenous increase in energy efficiency in mind; fewer are examining an
actual energy efficiency policy.
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Channels of the Rebound Effect: Microeconomic
When energy efficiency improves, the price of usage changes, so both substitution and
income effects influence consumers’ consumption and corresponding energy use. However,
retrieving measurements of these effects is far from trivial. We review the theoretical
microeconomic foundation for the rebound effect and show how this is translated into empirical
estimates. The sheer number of estimates of rebound effects in the literature is impressive and
the empirical approaches diverse. We filter them using modern empirical standards. Not all ‘old’
estimates lack credibility, and not all ‘new’ estimates should be believed. However, the changing
standards motivate our decision not to perform an exhaustive review of this expansive literature,
but instead focus on what we consider to be most reliable estimates. Our focus here is on
consumers; we will discuss production as part of the macroeconomic rebound discussion.
Substitution and Income Effects
In the context of a costless energy efficiency improvement, the decline in the cost of the
energy services implies that consumers will make a series of four adjustments to their
consumption bundle.3 These four adjustments may in turn affect their derived demand for
energy. First, consumers will substitute towards the more energy-efficient product, which is now
relatively less expensive. Second, consumers will substitute away from other relatively expensive
goods (and more broadly change their bundle of consumption towards complements and away
from substitutes of the energy efficient product). Third, the lower effective price for the energy
service increases the consumer’s purchasing power, so they will further increase consumption of
the more energy-efficient product (assuming it is a normal good). Finally, the increased
purchasing power means that consumers will increase consumption of other normal goods as
well. These effects each serve to either increase or decrease the amount of energy used for the
consumption bundle.

3

Readers interested in an expanded discussion and slightly more technical treatment should refer to Borenstein
(2015).
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Answers to Popular Misconceptions about the Rebound Effect
No Causality, No Rebound
Energy demand can increase for a whole host of reasons, with economic growth and improved energy
technology chief among them. But correlation is not causation, and causation must be established
before anything can be labeled “rebound.”

Developing Countries’ Rebound Could be Either Larger or Smaller than in
Developed Countries
We might expect total energy demand to increase more quickly in developing countries, but the
relative size of the rebound effect is theoretically ambiguous. It depends on the link between energy
services and other goods, like food and clothing. If they are substitutes, we could see a high rebound.
If they are complements—and plausible stories point in that direction—rebound would be lower.
Ultimately, the truth is an empirical matter. Thus far, most estimates from developing countries are in
line with those from developed countries.

Total Rebound Effect is Likely Smaller than the Sum of Its Parts
Rebound consists of four components: direct, indirect, macro price, and macro growth. A full
assessment needs to consider all four causal pathways. Yet the total effect may be smaller than their
sum, for estimates may include multiple channels. In some situations, different channels may subsume
or offset each other.

Don’t Mitigate Rebound, Maximize Welfare
Perhaps the largest misconception is one that focuses on the perceived ‘evil’ of the rebound itself. This
notion implicitly has in mind energy-minimization as the objective, rather than welfare-maximization.
Rebound occurs from consumers responding to changes in relative prices, so by revealed preference, it
provides welfare benefits (relative to no response). In an energy efficiency policy evaluation, including
the rebound effect is likely to add to the tally of benefits and will only increase costs due to external
costs from the additional usage.

These effects do not map perfectly into the terms most commonly used in the literature.
The ‘direct rebound effect’ is generally defined as the change in energy use resulting from the
combined substitution and income effects on the demand for energy-efficient product. This
definition is convenient because economists typically estimate elasticities of demand, such as the
elasticity of demand for air conditioning with respect to the operating cost of the air conditioner.
An operating cost elasticity of demand tells us how much additional air conditioning consumers
will use if their operating cost changes on the margin, while holding all other attributes constant
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(ZCB approach). For example, if the elasticity of demand with respect to the operating cost is 0.5, then 50 percent of the reduction in energy use from an improvement in energy efficiency on
the margin will be taken back by the substitution and income effects increasing the usage
(ignoring the substitution and income effects on other goods). Importantly, the direct rebound
effect ignores any changes to the demand for other goods due to either the change in relative
prices or purchasing power. Nonetheless, the direct rebound is useful for understanding the
consumer response to an energy efficiency increase.
The literature examines demand for all other goods via the ‘indirect rebound effect.’
However, the literature is inconsistent in the usage of this term. Some studies include any
changes in energy use from changes in demand for other goods, including from the substitution
and income effects, as well as any embodied energy used to create the energy efficiency
improvement (Azevedo 2014). Other studies are even broader and include any additional energy
use not captured by the direct rebound (including macroeconomic effects) as part of the indirect
rebound (Sorrell et al. 2008). However, it is most common to refer to the indirect rebound effect
as only the income effects on the consumption of all other goods. For example, buyers of a more
fuel-efficient vehicle may decide to spend the savings on an extra flight for vacation—another
energy-intensive activity. Or they may spend the savings on something much less energy
intensive, such as books and movies. The sign and magnitude of the effect is determined by the
difference in the energy intensity (per dollar) between the energy-efficient product (prior to the
efficiency improvement) and other goods consumed on the margin. Importantly, this more
common definition of the indirect rebound ignores the substitution effects on other goods from
the decrease in the price of using the more energy-efficient product. These are typically
implicitly assumed away as being insignificant. Similarly, it is also common to ignore any cost
of the efficiency improvement, even though such a cost would change the income effects,
reducing (increasing) them if the energy-efficient product before the improvement is more (less)
energy intensive than the marginal consumption bundle (Borenstein 2015).
Overall, the adjustments described above are no different from any other adjustments that
consumers make when confronted with a change in relative prices. So, by revealed preference,
consumers are enjoying private surplus gains. It follows that a net welfare decrease from a
rebound effect would only be possible if the external costs associated with these adjustments
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outweigh the private gains. This is possible, but requires externalities that are large enough to
outweigh the increased consumer surplus from the substitution and income effect responses.4
Measuring Microeconomic Rebound Effects
As the microeconomic rebound is made up of substitution and income effects across all
goods, a full attempt at measurement would require estimating these effects for all goods in the
economy—a daunting task. Instead, most studies focus on estimating the price elasticity of
demand for the more energy-efficient product (ZCB), ignoring the demand for other goods. A
few studies estimate the effect of a policy (PII), although again generally ignore effects on other
goods throughout the economy. There are also a few estimates of the income effects from
changing the energy consumption of all other goods, generally based on the average
consumption bundle, rather than the marginal consumption bundle. We are not aware of any
studies that estimate these effects jointly using comparable data sources. This may be
problematic since under common assumptions a greater increase in demand for the energy
efficient product (i.e., direct rebound) implies a smaller increase in demand for other goods (i.e.,
substitution and income effects on other goods) (Chan et al. 2014).
Before moving to estimates, several further words of caution are in order. First, to
provide reliable guidance, it is critical that studies estimate a causal effect. This is particularly
relevant to the use of demand elasticities to quantify the rebound effect. Many studies estimating
demand elasticities do not hold up to modern standards of identification, and fail to address
standard empirical issues such as simultaneity and other endogeneity concerns. For instance,
studies that rely on cross-sectional variation in fuel prices or operating costs may have difficulty
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in a cross-section. Such studies, even if well-executed,
tend to find demand to be much more elastic than studies not relying on cross-sections (e.g., see
West (2004)).
Second, elasticities of demand estimated using variation in fuel prices may not
necessarily provide insight into the response to changes in energy efficiency. Under standard
neoclassical assumptions, the utilization of an energy-using good is based on the operating cost
(i.e., the fuel price divided by the energy efficiency), so both a change in the fuel price and a
change in the energy efficiency of the good would change the operating cost in identical

4

See Chan and Gillingham (2014) for a more thorough investigation of these welfare effects.
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(opposite) ways. Thus, it is common to describe the fuel price elasticity of demand as the direct
rebound effect. However, in settings with multiple energy services using the same fuel, this
equality does not hold (Chan et al. 2014). Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that in the
context of passenger transportation, consumers may respond comparatively less to changes in
energy efficiency than to changes in fuel price (Gillingham 2011). This may occur because fuel
prices are more salient, since consumers see them every time they pay their energy bill. In this
case, using the fuel price elasticity of demand would overestimate the direct rebound effect. We
view this as an open area of research, for other studies show either no asymmetry in response
(Frondel et al. 2013) or an even greater response to changes in energy efficiency than fuel price
(Linn 2013). One reason we might see a greater response to changes in energy efficiency is the
perceived longevity of such changes. Li et al. (2014) finds that gasoline taxes appear to be more
salient than fuel prices, perhaps due to perceived longevity.
Third, the consumer response to any change in usage costs may vary based on the
timeframe of the response. When fuel prices change, in the short run consumers can choose how
many trips to take, what route to take, which vehicle to take if they have multiple vehicles, and
whether to take public transportation if it is available. In the medium run, they can purchase or
scrap vehicles, and in the long run they can choose where to live and work. For electricity
consumption when electricity prices change, consumers can immediately decide how much to
cool the air with air conditioning. In the medium run they can choose how many air conditioners
to own and which rooms to put them in. In the longer run, they could move to a different home
altogether. In both cases, long-run energy demand is likely more elastic than short-run demand.
Finally, each study of price elasticities is from a particular time and place. Demand could
vary depending on the conditions in the setting of interest. For example, Gillingham (2014)
shows that the elasticity of driving demand with respect to the price of gasoline exhibits
noticeable heterogeneity across different counties in California. One could imagine that there
would be even greater differences when examining a developing country or a country with an
extensive public transportation system. The bottom line is that even if an elasticity estimate is
internally valid, we should be cautious applying it elsewhere without considering its external
validity.
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Elasticities in Developed Countries
Given the above caveats, what is the state of the literature on relevant elasticities that can
guide economists and policymakers? Table 1 lists a selection of recent reliable estimates of
elasticities that we believe provide guidance in developed countries.5 Our review focuses on
overall demand or household-level demand due to the paucity of studies on commercial and
industrial demand.
The studies in Table 1 were selected both because they are more recent and use rigorous
empirical methods such as panel data methods, experimental designs, and quasi-experimental
approaches. They make at least a reasonable attempt to address potential endogeneity concerns
or convince the reader of internal validity. They tend not to rely on cross-sectional variation. All
provide either short-run or medium-run estimates. As is pointed out in Hamilton (2009) and
Gillingham (2011), including a lagged dependent variable to distinguish between short-run and
long-run responses relies on strong assumptions. Yet, nearly all estimates of long-run responses
are based on an OLS regression with a lagged dependent variable or are based on cross-sectional
variation (with the assumption that it is capturing a long-run equilibrium). Thus, we feel most
comfortable with the reliability of the short-run and medium-run estimates.
The primary theme that emerges from these studies is that the short-run and medium-run
elasticities of demand for gasoline/driving and electricity are generally in the range of -0.05 to 0.4. Ignoring the caveats above, these would suggest a direct rebound effect on the order of 5 to
40 percent, with most of the studies falling in the range of 5 to 25 percent. These studies all focus
on gasoline or electricity use and it may not be appropriate to apply the estimates to other energy
services, including those that use other fuels, such as natural gas or heating oil. For example,
there may also be a direct rebound effect for space and water heating. Unfortunately, the
evidence on the price-elasticity of demand for other energy services is remarkably scant, with all
of the published papers we could find over a decade old and using limited data. The reviews of
the older literature by Sorrell (2007) show wide ranges for most residential energy services. In
our view, new studies are needed on these other energy services. Just as importantly, new studies
are needed to help us understand how large the error might be from using own-price elasticities
for the direct rebound.

5

For more inclusive reviews of estimates of elasticities in different sectors, see Greening et al. (2000); Sorrell
(2007); Jenkins et al. (2011); and Gillingham (2011). Not surprisingly, these reviews show large ranges of estimates
in most sectors.
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Table 1. Selected More Reliable Elasticity Estimates from Developed Countries
Study

Type of price elasticity

Estimated
Value

Allcott (2011)

Illinois short-run elasticity of electricity demand 2003 &
2004

-0.1

Barla et al. (2009)

Canada short-run elasticity of VMT demand 1990-2004

-0.08

Frondel et al. (2013)

Germany short-run elasticity of VMT demand 1997-2009

-0.458ǂ

Gillingham (2014)

California medium-run new vehicle elasticity of VMT
demand 2001-2009

-0.23

Hughes et al. (2008)

US short-run elasticity of gasoline demand 1975-1980

-0.21 to -0.34

Hughes et al. (2008)

US short-run elasticity of gasoline demand 2001-2006

-0.034 to
-0.077

Ito (2014)

California medium-run elasticity of electricity demand
1999-2007

-0.088

Jessoe et al. (2013)

Connecticut short-run elasticity of electricity demand
2011

-0.12

Small et al. (2007)

US short-run elasticity of VMT demand 1966-2001

-0.045ᵞ

Notes: All electricity demand elasticity estimates are for residential customers.
ᵞ We use the estimate from the latest period; earlier elasticities were higher in absolute value.
ǂ

We report the fixed effects estimate, which we deem most reliable.

It also may be inappropriate to apply the estimates in Table 1 to other regions. Most of
the studies are in the United States, which has different circumstances than many other countries,
both developed and developing. This is illustrated by the results in Frondel et al. (2013), which
uses data from Germany, a country with better public transportation and higher gasoline prices
than the United States. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results in Frondel and Vance show a more
elastic response in driving to gasoline price changes than the other studies in Table 1.
Elasticities in Developing Countries
When we move beyond the developed world, the results in Table 1 may be less directly
applicable. In developing countries one might hypothesize greater responsiveness, and thus a
greater direct rebound effect, due to greater unmet demand for energy services. However, there
are a variety of country-specific factors that affect responsiveness in any given market, such as
the wealth of those who own vehicles or appliances.
In our review, we found a surprising number of papers estimating elasticities of usage for
durable goods in low and middle income countries. Not surprisingly, the authors writing these
papers often face severe data limitations and measurement error in the data. These studies also
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rarely meet modern standards for identification in applied economics and the caveats described
above certainly apply.
In Table 2, we present a representative selection of the studies published in peer-reviewed
journals. These are not filtered for reliability as in Table 1, since nearly all face data limitations
and should probably not be viewed as causal estimates.
As can be seen in Table 2, the estimates of demand elasticities in developing countries
range widely, with the most common range on the order of -0.1 to -0.4 in the short-run. Despite
the limitations in these studies, we were interested to find that the estimated elasticities are in the
same range as the developed countries’ estimates.
Estimated Policy-Induced Improvements
Using the price elasticity of demand as a measure of the substitution and income effects
for the good receiving the energy efficiency improvement is less helpful for understanding the
net effect of all of the changes that could occur with a policy-induced energy efficiency
improvement. Fortunately, there is some recent literature we can draw upon.
Davis (2008) analyzes a field experiment in which households are given more efficient
clothes washers and finds a price elasticity of clothes washing of -0.06. This estimate is similar
to, but not quite the same as a ZCB because the brand new clothes washers the households were
given were larger and gentler on clothes. In fact, the increase in utilization of the clothes washers
(i.e., more clothes being washed overall) came about from households running more clothes in a
wash. This estimate is, however, capturing the direct rebound effect of a PII from an energy
efficiency policy that provides free energy efficient clothes washers. It captures all of the effects
from both the change in energy efficiency and change in energy (i.e., clothes washing) service.
Davis et al. (2015) similarly examines the net effect of all of the changes that occur along
with an energy efficiency policy. Specifically, Davis et al. examines a program in Mexico that
provides direct cash payments and subsidized financing to consumers replacing old air
conditioners and refrigerators with new energy efficient appliances, much like the cash-forclunkers program for vehicles in the United States. The results indicate a very large response
from the replacement of old appliances with new energy-efficient ones: electricity use drops by
only seven percent after refrigerator replacement and actually increases after replacement of the
air conditioner. In this setting, there is potentially a very large change in the energy service, as
well as an income effect from the transfer, both conspiring to lead to a large rebound effect from
this PII.
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Table 2. A Representative Sample of Recent Price Elasticity Estimates from Low and
Middle Income Countries
Study

Type of elasticity

Estimated Value

Al-Faris (2002)

Gulf Cooperation Council short-run elasticity of total
electricity demand 1970-1997

-0.09

Alves et al. (2003)

Brazil short-run elasticity of gasoline demand 19741999

-0.09

Atakhanova et al. (2007)

Kazakhstan short-run elasticity of electricity demand
1994-2003

-0.128ǂ

Athukorala et al. (2010)

Sri Lanka short-run elasticity of total elasticity demand
1960-2007

-0.16

Ben Sita et al. (2012)

Lebanon short-run elasticity of gasoline demand 20002010

-0.623

Crotte et al. (2010)

Mexico short-run elasticity of gasoline demand 19802006

0 to -0.15

Halicioglu (2007)

Turkey short-run elasticity of electricity demand 19682005

-0.33 to -0.46

Iwayemi et al. (2010)

Nigeria short-run elasticity of gasoline demand 19762006

-0.25

Jamil et al. (2011)

Pakistan short-run elasticity of total electricity demand
2000s

-0.07

Lin et al. (2013)

China medium-run elasticity of gasoline demand 19972008

-0.196 to -0.497

Nahata et al. (2007)

Russia short-run elasticity of electricity demand 19952000

-0.165 to -0.28

Ramanathan (1999)

India short-run elasticity of gasoline demand 1972-1993

-0.21

Sene (2012)

Senegal short-run elasticity of gasoline demand 19702008

-0.12

Zein-Elabdin (1997)

Sudan short-run elasticity of charcoal demand 19601990

-0.55

Ziramba (2008)

South Africa short-run elasticity of electricity demand
1978-2005

-0.02

Notes: Gulf Cooperation Council countries are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman). All electricity
demand elasticity estimates are for residential customers unless otherwise noted.
ǂ

We report the IV fixed effects estimate.

Finally, Gillingham (2013) examines the direct rebound effect of a policy-induced change
in vehicle prices that leads to consumers purchasing different vehicles (each with bundles of
attributes) and then driving them more. The result is an elasticity of driving with respect to
operating costs of -0.15 for new vehicles in California. We believe that further research on the
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rebound effect of PII is very important for policy development and we hope to see more of it in
the future.
Effects on Other Goods
In addition to the direct rebound, there are also substitution and income effects for other
goods. Most studies aim only to estimate the income effects for other goods (calling this the
indirect rebound) and to answer the question: “If consumers are given an extra dollar, how will
they spend it?”6 One approach is to assume that consumers make purchases associated with the
average energy intensity of all consumer goods, an assumption often called ‘proportional respending.’ Studies that use this approach examine the energy intensity of the economy either
using input-output tables or other aggregate statistics of economic activity and energy use. A
second approach is to compare consumption patterns across income brackets using crosssectional data (Thiesen et al. 2008). A third approach is to use income elasticities that are based
on how consumers change demand for goods over time as income rises (Druckman et al. 2011).
The findings in the literature vary, but most recent work tends to find an estimate on the order of
5 to 15 percent (Druckman et al. 2011, Thomas et al. 2013). Thomas et al. (2013) also make
assumptions to attempt to bound the substitution effects for other goods in their estimate. One
would expect that these effects would vary depending on the cross-elasticities between the good
in question and other energy using goods, the additional cost of the more efficient good, and any
additional energy use from the production of the more efficient good. Notably, all existing
estimates assume a ZCB scenario, but additional costs would change the income effects for other
goods, reducing it if the product is more energy intensive than the marginal consumption bundle
Moreover, most of these estimates are from developed countries, although there is some notable
work on the income elasticity of energy use in developing countries (Wolfram et al. 2012).
Channels of the Rebound Effect: Macroeconomic
The macroeconomic rebound effect is complex. Markets re-equilibrate when the demand
for an energy resource changes, and an increase in energy efficiency may affect overall energy
demand through multiple channels of adjustment. In this section we seek to bring clarity to the
topic in three ways: 1) We define the “macroeconomic rebound” and review the theoretical

6

Technically, we would want to know how consumers would spend the dollar on all goods except the more energyefficient one.
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pathways that are thought to generate it; 2) we describe the challenges inherent in quantifying the
magnitude of the macroeconomic rebound, including a discussion of the pitfalls into which
common approaches stumble; and 3) we discuss our view of what is known and unknown, and
what this means for environmental economics research and policymaking.
Defining Macroeconomic Rebound Effects
As defined in the literature, macroeconomic rebound effects increase energy use after an
energy efficiency improvement through market adjustments and innovation channels. These are
easiest if considered in the context of a ZCB, and that is what underpins much of the discussion
below. However, it is theoretically possible to consider macroeconomic rebound effects in the
context of a PII, although we have never seen this done. Our exposition divides macroeconomic
rebound effects into a price effect and a growth effect.
Macroeconomic Price Effect
The ‘macroeconomic price effect’ is an economy-wide analog to the direct rebound effect
that works through prices (Gillingham et al. 2013). When an energy efficiency improvement
shifts the market demand curve for energy in, consumers and producers will adjust until a new
equilibrium is reached. Consider the oil market. An efficiency improvement in, say, the United
States will lower the global price, increasing the quantity of oil demanded on the global market.
This effect can be seen graphically in Figure 1. The initial increase in energy efficiency shifts the
global demand curve inward, from D to D’. Since a minus b is the shift in demand and a minus c
is the change in equilibrium quantity, the macroeconomic price effect is 1–(a-c)/(a-b). The
magnitude of this rebound effect is thus a function of the slopes of the demand and supply
curves, whereby increasingly inelastic supply and increasingly elastic demand induce a higher
rebound.
Macroeconomic Growth Effect
The ‘macroeconomic growth effect’—an oft-cited but poorly articulated concept—is the
rationale behind many of the backfire claims.7 In fact, the classic example given by Jevons

Consider the following quote on page 8 in Jenkins et al. (2011): “The more efficient production and use of energy
at a macroeconomic scale drives economic productivity overall and encourages the substitution of energy for other
factors of production (e.g., labor), resulting in more rapid economic growth and energy consumption
(‘macroeconomic rebound’ effects).”
7
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(1865) postulates a type of macroeconomic growth effect. The basic logic is that an increase in
efficiency of energy-consuming durables could spur economic growth—either through a
reallocation of growth through sectoral reallocation or overall growth through an increase in total
factor productivity. Economic growth requires additional energy consumption. There are three
main pathways by which the macroeconomic growth effect could occur.
First, sectoral reallocation due to a change in energy efficiency may occur with a change
in the relative return of sectors in the economy.8 A change in the productivity of energy inputs in
an energy-intensive sector may improve the relative return on investment in that sector, leading
that sector to grow relative to others. This can be (roughly) thought of as the supply-side analogy
to the substitution effects discussed earlier.
Figure 1. Macroeconomic Price Effect

8

Sectoral reallocation in response to changing costs is equivalent to a reallocation of inputs into aggregate
production in response to changing costs.
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A second potential channel is induced innovation: a shock to total factor productivity.
One possibility is that an energy efficiency policy (PII) leads manufacturers to update their
processes, thus inducing innovation. Alternately, a ZCB in one sector may spill over to others.
For example, the development of lighter-weight aircraft to improve aircraft efficiency may spill
over to other sectors and lead to lighter-weight vehicles. Of course, to be accounted as a rebound,
the innovation in other sectors must be attributable directly to the spillovers from the energy
efficiency improvement. Should such spillovers exist, they could increase or decrease energy use
in the other sectors. Whatever innovation effects occur, there is also the possibility that they are
magnified (or interact in some way) with the sectoral reallocation in a manner that generates
some path dependence.
A final potential channel of the macroeconomic growth effect relates to the deployment
of inframarginal resources freed by a ZCB. Macroeconomists often discuss the multiplier effect
of fiscal spending in a Keynesian context. One could postulate a similar channel for the
aggregated indirect rebound effects: dollars that are re-spent can engage “new” economic activity
that utilizes previously idle resources, causing the overall economic impact to exceed the initial
amount by some multiplier (Borenstein 2015). For such a multiplier effect to occur, there must
be idle resources available in the economy (such that the incremental resources do not simply
crowd out private investment). This may be the case during recessions, but is less likely to be the
case during economic upswings. Overall, there is severe disagreement between macroeconomists
about the size of the fiscal multiplier (Ramey 2011), and in fact the multiplier in the rebound
setting is slightly different, since there is long-term debt associated with fiscal stimulus, but not
with a ZCB. We are not aware of any study focusing directly on estimating such multipliers in
the context of energy efficiency.
Quantifying Macroeconomic Rebound Effects
Quantifying the magnitude of the macroeconomic price effect is not simple, though
guidance exists in the form of estimates of demand and supply elasticities. In contrast,
quantifying the macroeconomic growth effect can be quite problematic. The interconnectedness
of the global economy makes it extremely difficult to deploy more reliable empirical methods, so
we are often left with estimates of correlation rather than causation. Without carefully identifying
the mechanisms underlying the estimation of the effect, it is all too tempting to misattribute
increased energy use to an increase in energy efficiency, when in reality many other factors are
at work.
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Quantifying the Macroeconomic Price Effect
The magnitude of the macroeconomic price effect depends on the relative supply and
demand elasticities, as should be clear from Figure 1. If the demand elasticity is low and the
supply elasticity is high, then the effect will be small. The estimates given above for the price
elasticity of gasoline use suggest a relatively inelastic oil demand function, at least in the
medium-run. The supply of oil is considered relatively inelastic in the short-run due to capacity
constraints, but would be expected to be more elastic in the long-run, for it depends on how
development of new extraction technologies responds to price. Unfortunately, there is very little
empirical evidence on such supply elasticities. Borenstein (2015) uses oil supply elasticities of
0.2, 0.6, and 1.0 for a sensitivity analysis of the macroeconomic price effect using constantelasticity supply and demand curves. Given the remarkable innovations in oil extraction over the
past several decades with high oil prices, we agree with Borenstein that the long-run oil supply
elasticity may be rather high.
The estimates in Borenstein (2015) indicate that with an oil demand elasticity of -0.4 and
an oil supply elasticity of 1.0, the macroeconomic price effect is on the order of 30 percent. We
find a similar result with analogous calculations using linear demand and supply functions. The
possible range is quite large: with a supply elasticity of only 0.2 and demand elasticity of -0.6,
we can expect to see a macroeconomic price effect as large as 76 percent. While we do not
believe an effect this large is plausible, we acknowledge that this effect may be important in the
oil market. Given the likely high long-run oil supply elasticity and low or moderate demand
elasticity, we suspect a macroeconomic price rebound on the order of 20 to 30 percent in oil
markets. However, we have not yet seen evidence on other energy markets, such as electricity or
natural gas. For all markets, it is important to recognize that the macroeconomic price effect will
always be less than one. As long as we have a downward sloping demand curve and upward
sloping supply curve, backfire due solely to the macroeconomic price effect is theoretically
impossible.
Quantifying the Macroeconomic Growth Effect
Despite its centrality to backfire claims, the macroeconomic growth effect is the area of
research with the least amount of concrete evidence. Attempts to quantify the macroeconomic
growth effect are plagued by the same challenges that are encountered in most macroeconomics
research. Our global economy is a single, interconnected, complex dynamic system, rendering
economists’ most reliable micro-empirical techniques ineffective. It is thus nearly impossible to
make dispositive arguments about cause and effect in this setting. That is, we cannot say with
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empirical certainty how US fuel economy standards affect long-run energy use in the United
States, let alone in China.
Fortunately, basic economic theory provides some profound guidance on the
macroeconomic growth rebound most commonly discussed: sectoral reallocation. The key
insight is that the extent to which a ZCB leads to increases or decreases in overall energy use
depends on the elasticities of substitution in consumption and production. To see this, consider
the following simple example. A household consumes two goods, an aggregate consumption
good (e.g., food or clothing) and an energy service (e.g., driving). So households can use their
income to either purchase the consumption good or to purchase a car and energy to power the
car. The ZCB question is as follows: “what happens to aggregate energy use in the economy if
cars are made more energy efficient?”
In the consumer sector, the answer depends on the elasticity of substitution between
goods and energy services in the household utility function. Consider the extremes. If goods and
energy services are perfect substitutes, then the household will spend its entire budget on
whichever good has the highest utility per dollar spent. If energy services become less expensive
than goods (in utils per dollar), then the household may shift its entire budget in that direction.
On the other hand, if goods and energy services are perfect complements, then they will
optimally be consumed in fixed proportion. In that case, making one of the goods marginally
cheaper (e.g. through energy efficiency standards) will make little difference in consumption and
overall energy use. Importantly, since energy is a derived demand from energy services, ZCB
may cause the level of energy services to increase, but still require less energy than initially
needed. In fact, there must be a high degree of substitution towards energy services in
consumption for the level of actual energy use to increase above pre-energy-efficiency levels.
So far, this logic is the same as the logic behind the microeconomic substitution effects,
and for that reason the consumer substitution effects will be subsumed in estimates of the
sectoral reallocation effect. But sectoral reallocation is even broader; it depends not only on
patterns in consumption, but also in production. For production, precisely the same logic applies.
Where production occurs by combining energy inputs with non-energy inputs (e.g. capital and
labor), the degree of substitutability/complementarity in production determines the overall effect
of ZCB on energy use. If the inputs are highly substitutable, an increase in energy efficiency in
production will cause a large swing towards increasing energy inputs. If they are complements,
they must be used in fixed proportion, and energy demand will remain unchanged.
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A nice implication of these insights is that the sectoral reallocation rebound is largely
driven by the magnitude of substitution elasticities. Our intuition leads us to view energy and
non-energy inputs as more complementary than substitutable in both consumption and
production. Goulder et al. (1999) share this intuition. Its simulation model of alternate abatement
policies assumes complementarity of energy and other inputs to production.9 This leads us to
believe that macroeconomic growth rebound effects may be small. However, there is clearly
room in the literature for more research to better quantify the relevant substitution elasticities.
Literature on the Macroeconomic Growth Effect
The above insights are particularly useful to keep in mind when interpreting the literature
on the macroeconomic growth effect, which focuses primarily on sectoral reallocation. Other
channels may be implicitly subsumed in the macroeconomic growth effect, but to the best of our
knowledge have not been identified separately. There are three classes of papers in the literature
quantifying the macroeconomic growth rebound.
The first class of papers involves a structural model of the production function of the
economy that is used to make theoretical predictions about the rebound effect. The second
attempts to econometrically estimate the total rebound effect (macroeconomic and
microeconomic) using historical time series data. The third involves simulation models of the
economy based on input-output tables of economic activity and calibrated relationships between
key variables governing economic growth.
Beginning with Saunders (1992), there has been stream of papers in the energy
economics literature relying on the Solow growth model to provide theoretical insight into the
sectoral reallocation rebound. For example, Saunders (1992) examines how energy efficiency
improvements affect overall energy consumption using a single sector Solow growth model that
includes capital, labor and energy inputs. In this simple setting, the consumer considers energyintensive goods as perfect substitutes for non-energy-intensive goods. Thus, by construction,
Saunders finds that backfire can occur.
Our concern with this model, and many others in this literature, is that it relies heavily on
structural assumptions. For example, switching to a Leontief production function (perfect

9

Goulder et al. (1999) assumes an elasticity of substitution of 0.8. It may be even lower in our context, since the
energy efficiency intervention itself will already dictate substitution towards more energy efficient production
technology.
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complementarity of inputs) would immediately imply zero rebound. Of course, this is an equally
restrictive structural assumption as a single sector Solow growth model. While such theoretical
exercises are interesting, nearly any outcome is possible by carefully choosing structural
assumptions and functional forms.
This observation should not be surprising to macroeconomists, but it means that
numerical investigations are all the more important to provide real guidance on the magnitude of
all three of the channels of the macroeconomic growth rebound. Yet this is where causal
attribution is critical–and extremely difficult. For the last century, we have seen large increases
in energy use and in the energy efficiency of a variety of durable goods. To claim a causal
relationship between energy efficiency and energy use requires demonstrating that energy
consumption has not increased due to some other factor. Ideally, the experiment needed to
identify a ZCB would have a world with the ZCB and a world without. Unfortunately, just as for
many questions in macroeconomics, such an experiment is impossible. In fact, it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the effect of energy efficiency improvements from
exogenous economic growth and dramatic improvements in energy services that occurred at the
same time. Not surprisingly, the few econometric investigations using historical data to find
evidence of a combined rebound effect leading to backfire (e.g., Tsao et al. (2010) and Saunders
(2013)) are not in economics journals, where the standard for empirically identifying a causal
effect tends to be higher.
In the absence of credible identification, macroeconomists often build models of the
economy to simulate the effects of policies. This brings us to the third class of approaches used
to estimate the macroeconomic rebound effect: calibrated simulation models. These models tend
to be general equilibrium models based on input-output tables of economic activity or estimated
macro-econometric models with hundreds of equations. Of course, the results of such models are
driven by the structure of the model and the parameterization of the relationships. For this
reason, many macroeconomic modelers focus on modeling for intuition, rather than numerical
estimates.
The simulation models that are used to numerically estimate the macroeconomic rebound
effect perturb energy efficiency and compare the total energy consumption in the scenario to the
energy consumption in the business-as-usual case. If the change in predicted energy use is less
than the expected effect of energy efficiency, the difference is attributed to rebound; if total
energy increases, it is consistent with backfire. Some of the most interesting papers in this
literature build computable general equilibrium or econometric simulation models of the U.K.
economy (Barker et al. 2009, Barker et al. 2007, Turner 2009), and find results ranging from
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negative rebounds to massive backfire. The vast range of results may be useful for highlighting
what different combinations of structural assumptions and parameter values imply for the
macroeconomic rebound effect. But their reliance on correlations as structural parameters leave
us unconvinced that they provide real guidance as to the magnitude of the effect. These issues
are challenging, and clearly a valuable area for future research that combines clever empirical
approaches with carefully thought-out numerical simulations.
Discussion
In the face of these challenges, how should we view the magnitude of the macroeconomic
rebound effect? Recall first that estimates of the sectoral reallocation macroeconomic rebound
are not necessarily additive with respect to the microeconomic rebound effects, which are
typically already aggregated into the macroeconomic measure. Moreover, the macroeconomic
price and sectoral reallocation effects and may even be partly offsetting, for sufficiently lower
equilibrium energy prices may lead to a reallocation away from energy (Turner 2009).
Furthermore, to the extent that the numerical simulations are based on historical correlations,
rather than causal effects, we should be cautious of interpreting the exact point estimates too
literally.
That said, the macroeconomic growth effect may be substantial in certain circumstances,
and it is likely that there is at least some increase in energy consumption from the
macroeconomic growth effect. Thus, at this point, when considering a ZCB, perhaps the best
approach for a policy economist is to calculate the macroeconomic price effect based on the best
estimates of elasticities, and then perform a sensitivity analysis with different values of the
macroeconomic growth rebound effect. Two recent estimates of the macroeconomic growth
rebound that one could consider using for such a sensitivity analysis are 11 percent (Barker et al.
2007) or 21 percent (Barker et al. 2009).10 In our view, the literature does not provide convincing
evidence for backfire due to the macroeconomic rebound effect.
What does a macroeconomic rebound imply about the welfare effects of policy? The
price effect comes about from reaching equilibria in markets, which improves welfare. Sectoral
reallocation leads to more efficient production in an economy, improving welfare. If the energy
efficiency improvement induces innovation, this also would improve welfare. These welfare
10

This 21 percent is based on the 2020 estimate, while the 2030 estimate is 41 percent. However both include the
income effect within the macroeconomic rebound.
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gains may be countered by losses from greater external costs of production or consumption, so
the net welfare effects are ambiguous.
Conclusions and Lessons for Policy
The magnitude of the rebound effect is a debate that persists, with important implications
for energy efficiency policy. Yet the rebound effect has many facets, and the increasingly
voluminous literature has become confusing and difficult to translate into policy relevance. This
paper attempts to make three basic contributions. First, we introduce the important conceptual
distinction between a rebound effect associated with a costless energy efficiency improvement
that holds other attributes constant (ZCB), and an energy efficiency policy that may be bundled
with other product changes that affect energy use (PII). Second, we distill the empirical literature
on the microeconomic rebound into a manageable number of estimates that we view as the most
reliable. Third, we attempt to clarify the nature of the macroeconomic rebound, and discuss how
one might go about conceptualizing (or estimating) the size of the effect.
The existing literature does not provide support for claims that energy efficiency gains
will be reversed by the rebound effect. The total microeconomic rebound is, in most cases, on the
order of 20 to 40 percent when including all substitution and income effects and perhaps even
including the embodied energy in the energy efficiency improvement. Far less is known (or
knowable) about the macroeconomic rebound. We articulate a framework for thinking about
these effects that lead to three observations. First, in some markets the macroeconomic price
effect may be substantial, but must be less than 100 percent. Second, rebound based on sectoral
reallocation is likely smaller, since energy is more likely to be a complement to, rather than
substitute for, other inputs in production. Finally, little is known about the effects of induced
innovation and productivity on rebound. The literature exploring how regulation affects total
factor productivity lacks consensus. Regardless, if induced innovation and productivity lead to
rebound, quantifying the effect engenders the difficult task of determining a counterfactual path
of innovation and productivity. There is currently scant evidence to support this induced
innovation channel, but we see this as another area for future research.
The cumulative effect of these channels of rebound in a ZCB setting may be large in
some situations and smaller in others, even if the evidence does not support backfire. If pressed
to offer our subjective assessment, in most cases we do not expect the total rebound effect to
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exceed 60 percent, but we recognize that it is possible to have a larger total effect.11 One might
expect a PII to have a larger rebound due to associated changes in product attributes that
consumers value, but a smaller rebound to the extent that the cost of the policy mitigates both the
income and macroeconomic growth effects. In fact, sufficiently costly energy efficiency policies
may well engender negative rebound effects.
This underscores our primary conclusion: rather than focusing on the rebound and
backfire, it is more useful to focus on the economic efficiency of energy efficiency policies in the
broadest possible sense. The rebound effect is only one component that factors into the equation.
More importantly, it is also a factor that in most cases leads to welfare gains. This is especially
true for the one rebound aspect that is hardest to measure: induced innovation and productivity
growth from an energy efficiency policy. Should it indeed occur as a direct result of a particular
energy efficiency policy, it would only enhance welfare. More broadly, unless there are severe
external costs from the rebound, rebound would be a benefit, not a cost.
Rather than consider the rebound effect as a deterrent from passing energy efficiency
policies, policymakers should include these welfare gains in the tally of benefits of a policy. The
mistake of designing policies to ‘mitigate’ the rebound effect stems from a focus on minimizing
energy use, rather than the broader objective of maximizing economic efficiency. In sum, while
the energy savings from energy efficiency policies will be reduced by the presence of a rebound
effect, a ZCB rebound is likely to both conserve energy and increase welfare. The same may be
true for a PII rebound, but each policy will require its own analysis.

11

This 60 percent estimate is based on a 30 percent long-run microeconomic rebound, 25 percent macroeconomic
price effect, and 5 percent macroeconomic growth effect (accounting for the fact that estimates of the
macroeconomic growth effect both range widely and may be implicitly including some of the other rebounds), but
the breakdown may vary by context.
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